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abstract: this paper investigates differences in the behaviour and performance of listed spanish 
family and non-family firms resulting from the interaction of differences in productive efficiency 
and in preferences for control between the two groups of firms. We find that family firms grow at 
a smaller rate, choose less capital-intensive productive technologies and are more efficient in pro-
duction than non-family firms are. the evidence is consistent with institutional theories of the firm 
that predict competition among governance forms for the transactions to be governed to minimize 
production and transaction costs. the results of the paper highlight the relevance of using measures 
of productive efficiency, instead of measures of profitability, to test the effect of ownership in the 
performance of firms. 
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introduction1
this paper investigates how family ownership shapes the relationship 
between the preferences, behaviour and performance of family firms 
compared with the same relationships in non-family ones. We apply the 
conceptual framework to data from spanish firms listed on the stock mar-
ket during the period 1990 to 2004. the comparison of the behaviour and 
performance of family and non-family firms is of interest in itself, accord-
ing to the large recent literature on the topic. However, the framework of 
comparative institutional economics (demsetz, 1983; Williamson, 1985) 
originally applied to family ownership by Pollak (1985), under which this 
paper does the comparison, extends its interest into more general meth-
odological issues arising from the study of the relationship between own-
ership and performance of firms. 
1 the authors thank an anonymous referee for detailed and constructive comments on an 
earlier version of the paper. the financial support of mCyt, eCo2009-13158eCo is also 
acknowledged. 
propiedad Familiar y perFormance de la empresa: el eFecto 
neto de la eFiciencia prodUctiVa y la restricción al 
crecimiento
resUmen: este trabajo investiga las diferencias en comportamiento y per-
formance de las empresas familiares y no-familiares españolas que cotizan 
en bolsa, resultado de la interacción de diferencias en eficiencia producti-
va y en preferencias por el control entre estos dos colectivos de empresas. 
en el trabajo se obtiene que las empresas familiares crecen a una tasa infe-
rior, eligen tecnologías productivas menos intensivas en capital y son más 
eficientes en producción que las empresas no-familiares. sin embargo, no 
se encuentran diferencias en beneficios económicos, estructura financiera 
y coste de capital entre ambos colectivos de empresas. los resultados es-
clarecen la relevancia de utilizar medidas de eficiencia productiva en lugar 
de medidas de rentabilidad para contrastar el efecto de la propiedad en el 
performance de las empresas.
palabras claVe: empresas familiares, propiedad y performance, pro-
ductividad y rentabilidad.
propriÉtÉ Familiale et perFormance de l’entreprise: l’eFFet 
net d’eFFicacitÉ prodUctiVe et la restriction de croissance
rÉsUmÉ : Cette étude analyse les différences de comportement et de per-
formance des entreprises espagnoles familiales et non familiales qui cotent 
en bourse, résultat de l’interaction de différences  en efficacité productive 
et en préférences pour le contrôle de ces deux groupes d’entreprises. il 
est ainsi démontré que les entreprises familiales présentent un taux de 
croissance inférieur, choisissent des technologies productives moins inten-
sives en capital et sont plus efficaces en production que les entreprises 
non familiales. il n’y a, par contre, aucune différence concernant les bé-
néfices économiques, la structure financière et le coût de capital entre 
les deux groupes d’entreprises. les résultats déterminent l’importance de 
l’utilisation de mesures d’efficacité productive au lieu de mesures de ren-
tabilité pour différencier l’effet de la propriété dans la performance des 
entreprises.
mots-cleFs: entreprises familiales, propriété et performance, producti-
vité et rentabilité
propriedade Familiar e perFormance da empresa: o eFeito 
pUro da eFiciência prodUtiVa e a restrição ao crescimento
resUmo: este trabalho investiga as diferenças em comportamento e per-
formance das empresas familiares e não-familiares espanholas que ope-
ram na bolsa, resultado da interação de diferenças em eficiência produtiva 
e em preferências pelo controle entre estes dois coletivos de empresas. 
neste trabalho obtêm-se que as empresas familiares crescem a uma taxa 
inferior, elegem tecnologias produtivas menos intensivas em capital e são 
mais eficientes em produção que as empresas não-familiares. sem em-
bargo, não se encontram diferenças em benefícios econômicos, estrutura 
financeira e custo de capital entre ambos os coletivos de empresas. os 
resultados esclarecem a relevância de utilizar medidas de eficiência pro-
dutiva em lugar de medidas de rentabilidade para contrastar o efeito da 
propriedade na performance das empresas.
palaVras cHaVe: empresas familiares,propriedade e performance, pro-
dutividade e rentabilidade.
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Comparative institutional economics predicts that the ra-
tional (utility maximizing) behaviour of agents, together 
with perfect competition in the product market and differ-
ences in transaction costs across ownership forms all drive 
the ownership structure of firms towards an equilibrium 
where transaction and production costs are minimized. in 
this equilibrium solution, there are no opportunities to in-
crease wealth by moving a transaction from one owner-
ship form to the other, and economic profits are the same 
across ownership forms. demsetz & lehn (1985) were the 
first to test for and find empirical support of the hypoth-
esis inspired by comparative institutional economics that, 
controlling for the characteristics of the transactions that 
determine the choice of a governance or another one, no 
differences in profitability are expected among firms of dif-
ferent ownership structure. other papers (Cho, 1998; Him-
melberg, Hubbard & Palia, 1999; demsetz & villalonga, 
2001) have confirmed the original results.
However, conflicting evidence is also present. among large 
Us firms, Holderness & sheehan (1988) find that firms 
under family ownership create less economic value than 
non-family firms do. other studies (mcConaughy, Walker, 
Henderson, & mishra, 1998; anderson & Reeb, 2003b; vil-
lalonga & amit, 2006) find that listed Us family firms are 
more profitable than other listed firms, although the differ-
ences in performance can vary depending on whether the 
family owns, manages or controls the corporation. sraer & 
thesmar (2007) find evidence of superior performance of 
family firms among listed French corporations. miller, Bret-
on-miller, lester, & Canella (2007) show that differences in 
performance between family and non-family firms found in 
previous research may just be the consequence of the defi-
nition of family firm used in each paper or in the selection 
of the sample of firms used to test for the effect of owner-
ship in performance.
although the results of miller et al. (2007) contribute to the 
explanation of the contradictory empirical results and rec-
oncile these results with predictions from institutional eco-
nomic analysis of organisations, some unexplored issues 
on the economics of family firms deserve further research. 
some of these issues have to do with the cause-effect re-
lationships that link ownership-behavior and performance. 
traditional approaches (Baumol, 1959; Williamson, 1964) 
to the ownership-performance relationship in firms predict 
that managers controlled firms will have lower profitabil-
ity than owner controlled ones because the former choose 
a sales maximizing level of production while the latter 
choose a production level that maximizes profits. However, 
both forms of ownership were assumed to produce with 
the same level of production efficiency. 
the transaction-agency cost approaches to the ownership 
and performance relationship in firms (Jensen & meckling, 
1976; demsetz, 1983; Fama & Jensen 1983a,b, 1985; Wil-
liamson, 1985) predict that contracting costs affect the 
production possibilities of the firm because they interact 
with the technology in determining the output that can 
be produced with a given level of resources (total factor 
productivity). therefore, differences in performance do not 
result from differences in the objective function (maximiz-
ing sales or maximizing profits) but from differences in the 
production possibilities sets. if family ownership implies 
different contracting costs (between managers and own-
ers and in general among all interested parties) than those 
of non-family ownership, then we expect differences in pro-
ductive efficiency between the two forms of ownership for 
firms of similar size.
most of the empirical research on ownership and perfor-
mance of firms, referenced before, compares the profitabil-
ity (Roa; Roe, q ratio) of different ownership forms. only 
a few one compare productive efficiency as the new theo-
ries predict (some exceptions are Hill & snell, 1989, and 
mcConaughy et al. (1998), that compare labour produc-
tivity, as well as Galve-Górriz & salas-Fumás, 1996; Barth, 
Gulbrandsen, & schone, 2005; martikainen, nikkinen & 
vähämaa, 2009, that compare measures of total factor 
productivity). if differences in productive efficiency would 
directly translate to differences in measures of financial 
performance, then the use of productive efficiency or the 
use of financial measures to test the effect of ownership in 
performance would be irrelevant. nevertheless, we argue 
that a distinct feature of family firms is that the controlling 
group has stronger preferences for control than controlling 
shareholders in non-family firms. Under some circumstanc-
es, the stronger preferences for control can impose limits 
in size and growth of family firms that are not present in 
non-family ones. if this is the case, then differences in fi-
nancial performance of firms will reflect the interaction be-
tween differences in production efficiency and, possibly, 
the presence of growth-size constraints. in fact, in competi-
tive markets (where firms earn a return equal to the cost of 
capital), the only way over-constrained firms can survive is 
if they have higher productive efficiency. 
We present empirical evidence from listed spanish firms 
that support the hypothesis that family firms are more effi-
cient in production than non-family firms are. the evidence 
also shows that the two groups of firms have the same fi-
nancial performance and the evidence that supports the 
hypothesis that family firms are financially constrained can 
reconciles the two results. We expect the results shown in 
the paper hold in samples of firms from other many coun-
tries, like spain, where share ownership in listed firms is 
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highly concentrated (la Porta, lópez de silanes, schleifer, 
& vishny, 1999; morck, stangeland & yeung, 2000; Claes-
sens, djankov & larry, 2000; Faccio & lang, 2002). Be-
sides, family control requires the family members to be the 
controlling shareholder of the company. the exception is 
firms in the Usa and other anglo saxon countries where 
the founders, or their heirs, of listed firms control the firms 
with small shareholdings. if founders and heirs of firms in 
anglo saxon countries can have control of the firm hold-
ing an small percentage of the shares, then it can be ex-
pected that family controlled firms in these counties are 
not so financially constraint than family controlled firms 
in countries where family control requires majority share-
holdings by the family members. Higher productive effi-
ciency of founder-controlled firms that are not financially 
constrained will outperform other forms of ownership, as 
the empirical evidence from databases of Us firms seems 
to confirm.  
second section presents the theoretical background on 
the economic analysis of the family firm compared with 
that of firms that do not face the growth/size constraint. 
third section contains a description of the database, and 
fourth section is dedicated to the empirical test of the hy-
pothesis and implications from the profit maximization de-
cisions of firms. the conclusions contain a discussion and 
synthesis of the main results of the paper.
the basic theory and behavioural model 
the most defining feature of the family firm is the will to 
maintain ownership and control of the company in the 
hands of a group of people who share family ties, together 
with the will to continue doing so in future generations 
(Pollak, 1985; Casson, 1999; Chami, 1999). the desire to 
keep control within people who share family bonds comes 
from the non-pecuniary benefits the founder or their heirs 
get from such control, benefits that demstez & lehn (1985) 
refer to as “amenities potential”. of course, the family own-
ers will prefer more economic profits to less but, in general, 
they assume that the monetary pay-off needed to compen-
sate for the loss of control, and the loss of the amenities 
potential, is very high.
this paper focuses on cases where family control goes 
together with high share ownership of family members, 
since this is the dominant situation among the firms in our 
data sample. in fact, all firms–family and non-family–in 
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the sample have large shareholders, so the data base is 
not suitable for comparing performance between firms 
with high and low share concentrations as in papers by 
shleifer & vishny (1986) and Holderness (2003). Rather, 
the data are appropriate for comparing the behaviour and 
performance of firms with different dominant shareholders 
and, in particular, for comparing firms where the control-
ling shareholder is a family, with firms where the domi-
nant shareholder is not a family. a key distinction between 
these two forms of equally highly concentrated ownership 
is that non-family controlling shareholders only obtain pe-
cuniary benefits from control while families obtain pecu-
niary and non-pecuniary benefits, such as the amenities 
potential or the satisfaction of transferring the firm to de-
scendants (Gómez-mejía, Haynes, núñez-nickel, Jacobson, 
& moyano, 2007). 
the strong preferences for control attached to family own-
ership implies, for example, that their firms will have to 
accommodate their path of investment and growth to the 
availability of financial resources obtained from sources 
that do not jeopardise the family control of the firm. invest-
ment opportunities that would require issuing new shares 
sold to non-family shareholders that could interfere with 
family control will be rejected. the alternative of debt fi-
nancing will be limited by the restrictions on leverage set 
by banks. in addition, the possibility that family members 
subscribe the new shares issued by increasing the part of 
their private wealth invested in the firm will be limited by 
the desire to keep a well diversified portfolio of private 
wealth by each family member. therefore, assuming that 
family members are concerned about the diversification of 
their private wealth and face similar constraints to lever-
age than non-family firms, we can expect that family firms 
will be more financially constrained than non-family firms, 
which are more willing to give up control in their capital 
investment decisions for a high financial return. 
the following hypothesis summarizes this prediction:
Hypothesis 1: Family firms face a growth/size constraint 
that limits their expansion, compared to that of non-fam-
ily firms.
if family ownership introduces a constraint that non-family 
ownership can avoid, then family ownership can only earn 
higher or equal profits than non-family firms if the exclu-
sive governance advantage of family control provides ad-
vantages2 that compensate the limitation imposed by the 
2 Pollak (1985) and Chamil (1999) argued that family relations re-
inforce cohesion and trust among partners and, at times, among 
employees. they also argued that family ownership increases the 
level of commitment to successfully bringing off the managerial 
growth constraint (Fama & Jensen, 1983a,b; ang, Cole, & 
lin, 2000), as well as other possible disadvantages of fami-
ly control3. the advantages, if they exist, will be in the form 
of higher productive efficiency resulting from lower trans-
action costs of governance of family ownership compared 
with other forms of ownership. notice that the advantages 
of family firms must go beyond those resulting from high 
shareholding concentration, since other non-family control 
groups–such as banks, other non-financial companies, in-
stitutional investors, and personal shareholders with no in-
tention of being succeeded by their heirs–can also hold 
large blocks of shares and replicate the benefits of high 
concentration4. 
We then formulate the following hypothesis that is ex-
pected to hold especially in firms operating in competi-
tive product markets where constrained family firms must 
compensate the disadvantage of the growth-size con-
straint to survive.
Hypothesis 2: Family firms are more efficient in produc-
tion than non-family firms are.
People could argue that the survival condition of family 
firms is determined by a utility constraint, rather than 
the profitability constraint that conditions the survival 
of non-family ones. Given that utility depends on both 
profits and the non-pecuniary benefits of family control, 
family firms in competitive markets may operate under 
economic losses (return on investment lower than oppor-
tunity cost of capital) if amenities potential and non-pe-
cuniary benefits in general compensates for the economic 
project, since the success of the business also enhances the good 
name of the family (lyman, 1991; Brokaw, 1992). in addition, that 
family ownership increases the time horizon of decisions, as it is 
hoped that future generations will continue to promote the pros-
perous firm that has been passed on to them (James, 1999; stein, 
1989).
3 on the negative side, family owners are often more entrenched in 
relation to non-family block holders, delaying beyond the optimal 
point in time the substitution of family shareholders by better-qual-
ified professionals in the management positions of the firm, and 
selecting managers from a smaller pool of managerial talent than 
non-family firms (Gómez-mejía et al., 2001; Burkart et al., 2003; 
Pérez-González, 2006). additionally, concentration of ownership 
does not prevent other governance problems arising from conflicts 
of interest between family members, or distortion of incentives due 
to altruism or kinship behaviour (lansberg, 1983; Chami, 1999; 
schulze et al., 2001). 
4 of course, if family firms solve the agency problem of separating 
management from ownership in a more effective way than other 
types of large shareholders, then this is an additional advantage. 
Here, we assume that the entrenchment possibilities due to large 
shareholdings compensate for the lower agency costs of concen-
tration of ownership, in the same way for family as for non-family 
block holders.
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loss. We argue that this may be true for family firms not 
listed on the stock market but it is unlikely to hold for 
listed firms, as it is the case in our sample data. in a fam-
ily firm listed on the stock market, some non-family share-
holders do not share the benefits of control and will not 
accept returns lower than opportunity costs. therefore, 
the listed family firms will be forced to earn similar prof-
its than non-family ones to be able to attract minority 
external shareholders. 
Competitive pressures from product markets and the 
search for efficient ownership and governance forms of 
firms, together with shareholders’ expectations on re-
turns from their investments, will drive surviving firms to 
earn a return on their invested capital similar across own-
ership forms.
Hypothesis 3: Listed family and non-family firms obtain 
similar economic profits.
the financially constrained family firm 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 determine the structural conditions 
and constraints under which firms of different ownership 
form make their production and investment decisions. in 
this section, we want to examine the implications for the 
equilibrium profit-maximizing decisions of firms of such 
conditions and constraints. this will allow us to derive 
new empirical predictions that we will be able to empiri-
cally test to provide stronger support for the hypothesis. 
We consider a representative firm that produces an out-
put sold in the market at price p. output is produced with 
two inputs–labour and capital–which are purchased in 
the market at prices w and c, respectively. Prices are the 
same for family and non-family firms but we allow for 
the possibility that the two firms have different produc-
tion technology. We write the production function of the 
firm Q = F(K, L; O) where output Q depends on quan-
tities of labour L and capital K, and it also depends of 
the index O, which captures the effect of ownership on 
productive efficiency. We assume that the index can take 
two values–FA, family, and NF, no family ownership. F ( 
) is an increasing and concave function in K and L for all 
values of O (decreasing returns to scale). For operational 
purposes we write Q = A(O)G(K, L), so the ownership 
form determines the total factor productivity component 
of the production technology.
the family firm chooses the profit maximizing level of in-
puts subject to the distinct production technology (Hy-
pothesis 2) and subject to the condition that total capital 
is less or equal to the total invested capital compatible 
with family control, expressed by  K 5: 
 
 cKwLpQMax LK −−,
subject to  ),;( LKFAFQ 
  KK ≤
the non-family firm solves a similar problem but with a dif-
ferent production technology Q = F(NF; K, L) and with-
out the capital constraint.
let λ be the lagrange multiplier of the capital constraint. 
We can interpret this multiplier as the increase in profit 
if the binding capital constraint is marginally relaxed and 
we will refer it as the shadow price of capital. if the con-
straint is binding at the optimal solution, the first order 
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define ∑K the elasticity of the output Q with respect to 
input capital K, and ∑L the same elasticity with respect to 
labour, L. it is straightforward to show that (1) and (2) im-
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For the unconstrained non-family firm λ = 0. the constraint 
on total invested assets to protect family control imposes 
to family firms an implicit additional cost to invested capi-
tal equal to the shadow price of capital. this cost is added 
to the financial cost capital to determine the total unit 
cost of invested capital. 
From (3), the profit maximizing capital to labour ratios of 

















assuming similar elasticity for both firms. We then write 
the following proposition resulting from the profit maxi-
mizing behaviour of family and non-family firms.
proposition 1: The profit maximizing combination of la-
bour and capital of family and non-family firms implies 
5 the value of  K could be obtained as the result of a utility maximi-
zation problem, where utility increases with profits and decreases 
with size, since larger size implies more dilution of family control 
rights, subject to the technology constraint of the production func-
tion. We have substituted an explicit size constraint in place of ex-
plicit utility maximization to simplify the exposition. 
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that the capital per employee of the family firm is less or 
equal to that of the non-family firm, and strictly lower if 
the capital constraint is binding.
Proposition 1 has implications for the determinants of the 
rate of return of the two firms in the optimal solution. 



























R 1   
From the first order condition, (1), this can be written as, 







∂ λ1  (4)
Competition among ownership forms and the hypothesis 
that shareholders expect similar return from their shares in 
family and non-family firms will imply, in the equilibrium, 
that family and non-family firms will earn similar rate of 
return. if product markets are competitive, the returns will 
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For the unconstraint, non-family firm, we expect the rate 
of return on invested to be independent of the stock of in-
vested capital. For the family firm, we expect a marginal 
increase in the stock of invested capital to have a posi-
tive effect on the rate of return of the invested capital. 
the reason is that the family firm is operating at a level 
of capital equal to that allowed by the financial constraint 
and at this value of the capital stock the profit function is 
increasing with the capital stock (positive shadow price of 
capital). if the capital constraint was not binding, then the 
shadow price will be zero and the marginal change of the 
rate of return to changes in the level of constrained capital 
would be equal to zero for the two firms.
if firms have market power and earn economic profits, then 
the rate of return will be above the cost of capital. if fam-
ily and non-family firms earn similar rate of return, then 
RFA = RNF > c. From (4), non-family firms (shadow price 
λ = 0) with market power will operate at a point where a 
marginal increases in capital would produce a decrease in 
their average rate of return on invested capital. For family 
firms, the change in average rate of return may be positive 
or negative depending on whether λ is greater or smaller 
than RNF – c. in any case, the effect on the rate of return 
will always be larger for family than for non-family firms.
proposition 2: The sensitivity of rate of return on invest-
ed capital to changes in the stock of invested capital is 
expected to be non positive for non-family firms and un-
restricted in sign for financially constrained family firms. 
at the same time, the sensitivity of the rate of return to 
invested capital in family firms is always greater or equal 
than the sensitivity in non-family firms, if both firms do 
business under similar competitive conditions in their la-
bour markets.  
other predictions
one-way family firms have to avoid the financial constraint 
is to produce with less (more) capital (labour) intensive tech-
nologies. so far, we have assumed that technology related 
differences between family and non-family firms were lim-
ited to the total productivity parameter of the production 
function but it could be realistic to assume that there may 
be differences in other parameters of the technology too. 
in particular, preferences for less capital-intensive technol-
ogies among family firms would imply that the elasticity of 
output to capital ∑K in the production function of family 
firms is lower than that of in non-family firms. in case that 
there is only one competitive technology in a market and 
the technology is highly capital intensive, then family firms 
may be forced to stay out of that market and instead be 
active in markets where labour intensive technologies are 
viable. this would imply that the density of family firms is 
expected to be non homogeneous across industries and, 
in particular, it would be expected to be higher (lower) in 
markets where viable technologies are relatively more la-
bour (capital) intensive. 
the assumption that the financial structure of family and 
non-family firms is expected to be similar because both 
firms care equally about financial leverage and risk can be 
subject to empirical testing. in fact, the empirical evidence 
on whether family firms are more leveraged than non-fam-
ily firms is mixed6. therefore, in the empirical analysis we 
will also test for differences in leverage between family 
and non-family firms under the null hypothesis that no dif-
ferences exist. 
6 mishra & mcConaughy (1999) find that family firms are less lev-
eraged than non-family firms are. However, anderson & Reeb 
(2003b) do not find differences in the financial structure of family 
and non-family firms. Both papers referred to Us firms. schulze et 
al. (2003) find a U-shaped relation between use of debt and dis-
persion of ownership within family firms in high growth industries, 
which is interpreted in terms of response to agency problems of 
family ownership.
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description of the data on listed 
family and non-family firms
the sample of firms used to test the hypothesis on the 
structural conditions and behaviour predictions of family 
versus non-family firms includes all non financial and non-
regulated firms (for example banks and energy producing 
firms are excluded from the analysis) listed on the span-
ish stock exchange in 1990 that continue to be listed on 
the exchange in 2004. Fifty-three firms are included in the 
sample, of them 29 are family firms and 24 are non-fam-
ily firms. the empirical analysis includes some descriptive 
information about the time evolution of ownership and 
shareholdings of spanish listed firms from 1990 to 2004. 
However, since the balance sheets and income statements 
of firms are available only until 2002 (there is regularly 
a two years delay in accounting reporting and data on 
shareholding are constantly updated), the tests of the hy-
pothesis and propositions formulated above are done with 
year and firm data available for the period 1990 to 2002. 
moreover, accounting data are incomplete for two firms 
in the ownership sample so the analysis on behaviour and 
performance of firms will be limited to 51 firms. 
this sample of firms has several advantages for the pur-
pose of this paper. First, the two groups have been sub-
ject to the same external shocks during the long period 
under study (13-15 years). second, focusing our study on 
listed firms has the advantage that minority shareholders 
will only buy shares if they can expect a return that cov-
ers the opportunity cost so listed family and non-family 
firms face a similar minimum profitability constraint7 as 
a condition to assure their survival. third, to open share 
ownership to non-family members through public offer-
ings is the last resort of family firms to finance growth 
before selling their block of control. among family firms, 
those listed are then the less affected by the growth con-
straint. thus, if we find evidence of such constraint in our 
sample, we can extrapolate the validity of the hypothe-
sis to all family firms. Finally, among spanish listed firms, 
shareholding rights are similar to cash flow rights (Crespi 
& García-Cestona, 2001), so agency problems are reason-
ably under control and the most relevant governance is-
sue is the difference in the preferences and competencies 
of the dominant shareholders. 
7 if all financing of the firm came from family members, the compari-
son of profitability between family and non-family firms could be 
distorted because family firms have non-pecuniary benefits of con-
trol that compensate for lower profitability. in their analysis of the 
efficiency of family ownership, schulze et al. (2001) and Gómez-
mejía et al. (2001) ignore the non-pecuniary benefits of control as 
part of the utility received by owners and managers of family firms.
in this paper, a listed company is considered a family firm 
if the sum of the shareholding (direct and indirect) held 
by shareholders of the same surname is the largest block 
holder among all other block holders in the company and 
any or some members of the family are involved in the 
management and the board of the firm. this is a more re-
strictive definition of family firm than those of other pa-
pers, such as anderson & Reeb (2003a, b) and villalonga & 
amit (2006), where a firm is considered a family firm if the 
founding owner or the heirs occupy significant positions 
on the board of directors, or in the management of the 
company. in our sample of firms, shareholdings are high-
ly concentrated so it would be unrealistic to assume that 
the firm is under family control when a large sharehold-
er holds more shares (voting rights) than family members 
hold.  in our definition of family firm, ownership manage-
ment and control of the firm by the dominant shareholder 
will go together, and the distinction made by villalonga & 
amit (2006) in this respect does not apply. moreover, in 
all family firms more than one family member is a share-
holder, manager or board member. so the class of family 
firm where only the founding entrepreneur is directly in-
volved in the management and governance of the firm–for 
which miller et al. (2007) find differences in financial per-
formance compared with respect to other classes of firms–
is empty in our sample. therefore, we do not need to be 
concerned about the sensitivity of the results found in the 
investigation to the definition of family firms, as in miller 
et al. (2007), since ownership and control are quite homo-
geneous across all firms in the sample.
the sources of information used to identify the sharehold-
ers and their respective shareholdings are mainly the files 
of the spanish national Commission for the stock market8, 
along with other non-official files such as the maxwell di-
rectory and company records. 
the samples of listed spanish firms qualifying for the anal-
ysis in 1990 consisted of 150 companies. of them, 57 
(38%) had a family as the dominant shareholder, and 93 
(62%) did not. Fifteen years later, in 2004 (see table 1), 
only 53 firms out of the 150 remain listed (35%). of them, 
29 are family firms and the rest non-family ones. there-
fore, the proportion of family firms within the firms that re-
main listed is now 54.7%, compared with the initial 38%. 
a few of the firms in the sample had changed ownership 
form during the period. two of the family firms that remain 
8 in spain, listed companies are required to report to the nation-
al Commission the names and shareholdings of shareholders with 
blocks of shares of 5% or more, and any holdings of those people 
who sit on the board of directors, and if these shareholders are in-
volved in the management of the firm.
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listed have become non-family and five firms that began 
as non-family in 1990 have become family firms. moreover, 
among those firms that have been liquidated or are inac-
tive, 13 (14% of all non-family) of them are non-family and 
3 (5%) are family firms. 
tables 2 and 3 contain data about the distribution of 
shares in each of the main control groups identified in 
the sample of spanish listed companies: Families, nation-
al companies, foreign investors, financial institutions, and 
state. as shown in table 2, in all control groups the larger 
shareholder has, on average, at least 28% of the shares. 
among family firms, the average percentage of shares held 
by the largest shareholder–the family owner–was 49.2 in 
1990 and 46.8 in 20049. if we count the shares held by 
the five largest shareholders, the lowest average percent-
age of shares in 1990 was 35.8 in the group of firms where 
the main shareholder was a foreign firm. differences in 
shares concentration across control groups remain stable 
over time. table 3 shows the shareholdings of the control 
group and of other types of shareholders, in decreasing or-
der of importance, in 1990 and in 2004. the percentage of 
shares up to 100 would be, approximately, the free-float of 
shares in each group. this fraction is rather low and, if any-
thing, it has decreased over time. the massive privatisation 
process in the late nineties explains why, in 2004, none of 
the listed firms in the sample is under state control. 
the descriptive information of the data set is compiled in 
table 4, which contains descriptive statistics, mean and 
median, separated for family and non-family firms of size, 
assets’ composition, leverage and profitability. the data 
for the calculation of the values in the table are collected 
from the balance sheet, income statement and annual re-
9 these figures are again in sharp contrast to those of anderson & 
Reeb (2003a) and villalonga & amit (2006) in their s&P and For-
tune 500 samples, where average shareholdings of family members 
in family firms are 18% and 16% respectively.
ports that listed firms report annually to the Cnmv, the 
national supervisory authority for listed firms, being ex-
pressed all variables at constant prices of year 200210. the 
table also shows the results of the test of the null hypoth-
esis of equal mean and equal median of the variable for 
family and non-family firms. 
For all the size variables (sales, assets, employees and val-
ue-added–sales minus cost of inputs purchased to other 
firms), family firms are significantly smaller than non-fam-
ily firms are. Regarding to composition of assets, family 
firms have a lower proportion of fix assets over total assets 
and a higher proportion of intangible assets than non-fam-
ily firms do. Family firms also have lower volume of assets 
per employee (observed capital intensity) than non-family 
firms do. the test of equal profitability gives mixed results. 
For example, the mean of Roa (profits before interest and 
taxes over assets net of accounts payable) is higher in fam-
ily firms, but the median of tobin’s q (market value of share 
prices plus book value of debt over net assets of the firm, 
all variables referred to end of the year) is higher among 
non-family firms. Family firms also hold relatively less long-
term debt than non-family firms do11. 
10 Public accounting data of firms are available with two years of de-
lay while data on shareholdings is updated permanently. this ex-
plains that data on ownership and shareholdings run 1990 to 2004 
while data from accounting statements end in 2002. 
11 to compare our sample with that of anderson & Reeb (2003a) for 
the Usa may be of interest. their sample size is 319 firms from 
the s&P 500 and covers the period 1993 to 1999. around 33 per 
cent of the firms have members of the founding family in manage-
ment or board positions. non-family firms are larger than family 
firms (average assets of 16,433 millions and 9,560 millions of 
dollars, respectively) but also 12 years younger, on average, for 
a total of 78 years. in our sample, the proportion of family firms 
is larger (38%), their average size is smaller, 67 millions of euros 
and have the same average age than non-family ones. villalonga 
& amit (2006) also report around one third of family firms in their 
Fortune 500 sample, although they do not observe differences in 
table 1. non-financial and non-regulated firms listed in the spanish stock market in 1990 and their situation in 2004
Family firm non-family firm total
number percentage number percentage number percentage
listed firms in 1990 57 38.0 93 62.0 150 100
Firms no longer listed in 2004 -31 -20.6 -66 -44.0 -97 -64.6
non active or liquidated 3 2.0 13 8.7 16 10.7
self excluded by public offer 28 18.6 51 34.0 79 52.6
merger or acquired 0 0 2 1.3 2 1.3
Firms that remain listed in 2004 26 17.4 27 18.0 53 35.5
Changes from family to non-family firm -2 -1.3 2 1.3 - -
Changes from non-family to family firm 5 3.3 -5 -3.3 - -
Firms listed in 2004 29 54.7 24 45.3 53 35.3
source: own elaboration with data from files of the spanish stock exchange Commission.
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size between the two ownership groups. in the sample of miller et 
al. (2007), family firms are smaller than non-family firms but the 
former are also younger than the later so differences in size are 
likely to disappear when controlling for age.
table 2. comparative average shareholdings’ concentration in years 1990 and 2004 for each control groups (firms listed in 
1990 that remain listed in 2004)
1990 2004
largest three largest Five largest largest three largest Five largest
control group shareholder shareholders shareholders shareholder shareholders shareholders
Family firms 49.2 65.1 66.5 46.8 66.4 74.6
other spanish firms 31.5 46.8 50.6 28.0 44.3 51.1
Foreign ownership 29.8 35.8 35.8 47.2 57.8 60.3
Financial institutions 33.4 42.8 44.6 29.7 56.9 68.6
state ownership 32.3 81.0 85.0 - - -
source: own elaboration. data from files of the spanish stock market Commission.


























Family firms 54.2 8.0 3.6 3.1 - 54.9 18.7 3.8 4.0 -
other spanish firms 2.5 37.5 7.3 8.5 - 6.5 39.7 4.1 4.7 -
Foreign ownership 3.4 1.0 29.8 1.6 - 4.2 6.5 48.5 1.1 -
Financial institutions 0.2 1.6 4.5 38.5 - 7.9 10.5 7.6 59.3 -
state ownership 0.0 0.0 25.0 10.4 32.3 - - - - -
source: own elaboration with data from files of the spanish stock market Commission.
table 4. means, medians and statistics from tests of differences in means and medians for size, performance and financial 
structure variables between family and non-family firms 
Family non-family
mean median mean median
t-student differ 
(means)
Kruskal walis test 
chi-square differ (medians)
sales§ 51.774 23.768 307.005 51.044 -2.6*** 20.4***
assets§ 67.238 34.331 1196.827 92.890 -3.2*** 54.7***
value added § 15.086 6.410 229.558 19.436 -2.8*** 49.6***
employees 258 144 2246 179 -2.3*** 7.2***
age of the firm 46.96 42.0 49.63 40.0 -0.4 0.04
Roa 0.111 0.082 0.085 0.078 2.5** 1.4
ROA/r 1.305 0.841 1.101 0.787 1.3 0.1
tobin’s q 1.368 0.973 1.231 1.139 1.3 8.8***
Assets/Employees 153.68 59.71 662.46 153.78 -6.2*** 34.2***
Intangible assets/Assets 0.043 0.005 0.019 0.005 4.0*** 0.21
Fixed assets/Total assets 0.546 0.582 0.704 0.748 -5.4*** 23.9***
Equity/Assets 0.702 0.742 0.676 0.692 1.2** 2.8*
Long term debt/Total debt 0.550 0.584 0.617 0.672 -2.1** 19.0***
[r] Interest expenses/Total debt 0.121 0.088 0.124 0.091 -0.3 0.2
Assets/Employees@ -5,9
note. the sample consists of family and non-family spanish listed firms in 1990 that remain listed in 2004. the number of firm-year observations was 444 for the period 1993-2002. the source of 
information used is mainly the files of the spanish national Commission for the stock market.
§ millions of euros
@ when we properly account for industry and time effects the variable Assets/Employees is modelled as a function of the dummy variables FA, Industry and time. The econometric estimation of the 
model (ols) gives a coefficient of -463 for the variable Fa, with t statistic equal to (–5.9), significantly different from zero at p value of 0.001 or less.
*** p ≤ 1%; ** p ≤ 5%; * p ≤ 10%.
source: own elaboration. data from files of the spanish stock market Commission.
164 reV.  innoVar Vol.  21,  núm. 40,  abril-jUnio de 2011
empresas de menor tamaño
test of the hypothesis and of 
the propositions derived from 
the behaviour of firms 
differences in size and growth 
Hypothesis 1 postulates that family firms are expected to 
grow at a lower rate and, assuming similar age, be of small-
er size than non-family firms are. We can directly test this 
hypothesis from the relationship between size (assets), age 
(T), and average growth rate (g) as follows:
  TT gAssetsAssets )1(0 
Where AssetsT are the current total assets of the firm (in 
year 2002, last year available) and Assets0 are the (un-
known) assets when the firm was created in year 2002 – T. 
taking logs, we have Ln AssetsT = Ln Assets0 + T Ln(1+g). 
therefore, we formulate the empirical model: 
 
 ε CVTbaAssetsLn T  (5)
where a = Ln Assets0; b = Ln(1+g) ≈ g; T = Age of the firm,
CV are the control variables (industry dummy variables) 
and ε is a random error term. to test for difference be-
tween family and non-family firms, the model is modified 
adding the variable FA. this is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the firm is a family firm and zero other-
wise, and the variable FAT, the product of the dummy FA 
and age T to allow for differences the averages of size and 
growth between the two samples of firms.
table 5 presents the results of the tests of differences 
in size and growth rates between family and non-family 
firms. model 1 tests for differences in the average size in 
the two groups of firms in 2002, not controlling for differ-
ences in age. the negative and statistically significant esti-
mate of the coefficient for the dummy variable FA implies 
that family firms in average have less assets than non-fam-
ily ones, controlling for industry effects. the result is simi-
lar when we compare sizes controlling for age, column 2. 
the last column of table 5 tests for differences in average 
growth rates between family and non-family firms. the 
negative estimated coefficient of the variable FAT con-
firms that family firms grow at a lower real average rate 
(2%) than non-family firms do (4%). 
differences in capital to labour ratios and differences 
in the sensitivity of roa to assets of firms
one implication of the financial constraint is that, when 
binding, the family firm will choose a ratio of capital to 
labour lower than the non-family firm works. table 4 pro-
vides preliminary evidence confirming this prediction, since 
assets per employee are statistically lower in family firms 
than in non-family firms. that test, however, does not con-
trol for possible industry and time effects, so we test for 
the difference in means of the K/L ratio (assets per em-
ployee) controlling for these effects. the new results con-
firm that the assets per employee in family firms are lower 
than the assets per employee in non-family firms and that 
the difference is statistically significant at p <0.001 (see 
Table 4, variable: Assets / Employees@)12.
Proposition 2 summarizes the consequences of the size 
constraint in terms of a positive marginal cost of growth in 
family firms (shadow price of invested total assets is posi-
tive). From an empirical point of view, this result means 
that the slope of the relationship between return on assets 
and the total assets of the firm will be higher in the group 
of family firms. the empirical model to test the proposition 
2, equation (4), is formulated as follows:  
  CVLnAssetsFAAssetsLnbaROA  λ  (6)
Where ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/Assets) and CV 
are the control variables (time and industry dummy vari-
ables Assets/Employees to account for possible differ-
ences in the production technology). equation (6) gives 
12 the limited sample size and the high aggregation of economic sec-
tors used in this paper do not allow us to compare the distribu-
tion of family firms across industries. With a sample size of over 
1725 family and non-family spanish manufacturing firms, listed 
and non listed on the stock market, Galve & salas (2003) find that 
the proportions of family and non-family firms are unevenly distrib-
uted across manufacturing sectors, with a higher proportion of the 
former in more labour intensive sectors than in more capital inten-
sive ones.
table 5. growth and size of family and non-family firms 
model 1 model 2 model 3






















R2 0.14 0.25 0.25
F 2.2**   3.1***   3.1***
*** p ≤ 1%; ** p ≤ 5%;  * p ≤ 10%.
source: own elaboration. data from files of the spanish stock market Commission.
table 5 presents the results from tests for differences in size and growth between family and non-
family firms (extended equation (4)). the dependent variable is log assets in 2002. model 1 tests 
for differences in size. model 2 tests for differences in size controlling for age. model 3 tests for dif-
ferences in growth rate. in all models, the explanatory variables include industry dummies whose 
estimated coefficients are not reported. values of t-student stadistics in parenthesis (computed 
from standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity).
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the locus of the Roa as a function of the total assets of 
firms in the sample. the slope of ROA to changes in capi-
tal stock K is equal to b/K for the non-family firm and to 
(b+λ)/K for the family firm (b plus the shadow price). ac-
cording to the theory, the null hypotheses are that esti-
mated b will be non positive and λ will be positive if the 
financial constraint is binding. 
table 6 presents the results of the estimation. the estimate 
negative coefficient of the variable Ln Assets in the group 
of non-family firms is consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms in the sample have some market power (ROA above 
cost of capital). the positive and significant coefficient of 
the variable FA LnAssets is also consistent with the theory 
(the sensitivity of Roa to changes in the assets of the firm 
is higher in family tan in non-family firms) and provides 
additional evidence supporting the hypothesis that family 
firms are financially constrained. 


















*** p ≤ 1%; ** p ≤ 5%;  * p ≤ 10%
note: differences in observations among this regressions and some regressions of table 8 are due 
to missing data for some firms and years.
source: own elaboration. data from files of the spanish stock market Commission.
table 6 presents the estimation of the locus of Roa and total assets of the firms (equation (6)). 
the model allows for differences in the sensitivity of Roa to changes in the assets of firms between 
family and non-family firms and controls for differences in the ratio of assets per employee (Assets/
employees). Control variables of time and industry dummies although their estimated coefficients 
are not reported. values of  t-student stadistics in parenthesis (computed from standard errors ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity).
differences in productive efficiency 
and production technology
in this section, we test Hypothesis 2 on differences in 
the production efficiency between family and non-family 
firms. We will measure the productive efficiency of each 
firm in the sample in terms of solow’s total Factor Produc-
tivity (tFP), obtained from the estimated production func-






this measure of productive efficiency has significant ad-
vantages over partial productivity measures (output per 
employee, for example), such as those used in Hill & snell 
(1989) and in mcConaughy et al. (1998). For example, 
output per unit of labour can be higher in one firm com-
pared to the other because the former uses more capital 
per unit of labour, not because it is more efficient in pro-
duction. 
if the production function is of the family of Cobb douglas 
functions Q = AKαLβ, where A, α and β are positive pa-
rameters, A gives a measure of TFP while α and β are the 
elasticity of output to capital and to labour respectively. if 
family and non-family firms can use different production 
technologies, the estimation of the production function 
should allow for differences in the elasticity parameters, α 
and β for the two groups of firms. the assumption of high-
er productive efficiency for the family firm implies that the 
parameter A satisfies condition AF > ANF. 
From the Cobb douglas specification of the production 
function, Q = AKαLβ, dividing both sides of the equation 
























 ϕηγδα  (7)
where FA is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the firm is a family firm and zero otherwise; a = LnA is 
the estimation of the log of TFP, and δ = α + β – 1 is a 
measure of the scale of economies in the production func-
tion, so that δ = 0 implies constant returns to scale, δ > 1
increasing returns and δ < 1 decreasing returns. Finally, 
CV means control variables, in particular dummy variables 
that control for industry and time effects. output Q is val-
ue added at constant prices of 2002, deflated by the price 
index of the respective industry; K is measured by the total 
assets of the firm net of accounts payable, also at constant 
prices, and L is measured by the number of equivalent full 
time employees.
the coefficients of the variables multiplied by FA allow for 
differences in the production function of family and non-
family firms. For example, a positive and significant esti-
mated value for γ will be consistent with the hypothesis of 
higher productive efficiency of family firms. the estimated 
value of η will indicate differences in the elasticity of out-
put to capital between family and non-family firms. For ex-
ample, a negative estimated value implies lower elasticity 
of capital and less capital intensity of family firms, com-
pared to non-family firms.
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table 7 presents the results of estimating equation (7); the 
estimation is performed using ols with standard errors ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity. the first column corresponds to 
the estimation assuming that the production technologies 
are the same for the two forms of ownership. the second 
estimation allows for differences in all the coefficients of 
the production function of family and non-family firms. the 
estimated coefficients of the cross-effect variables are all 
statistically significant, so the null hypothesis of equal pro-
duction technology is rejected. this result contrasts with 
that of martikainen, nikkinen & vähämaa (2009) who do 
not reject the null hypothesis of similar technology for fam-
ily and non-family firms with data from Us firms.
the coefficient of the variable Ln Employees is negative, 
so there is evidence of decreasing returns to scale. the es-
timated elasticity of output to capital, α, and elasticity of 
output to labour, β, are respectively 38.4% and 51.9% for 
non-family firms. For family firms, the elasticity of output 
to capital is 22.3% (0.384 – 0.161), significantly lower 
than for non-family firms, while the elasticity of output to 
labour in family firms is similar to the elasticity estimated 
for non-family ones (51.3%)13. the empirical evidence con-
firms that family firms produce with less capital-intensive 
technologies than non-family firms do. in model 2, the co-
efficient of the dummy variable FA is significantly greater 
than zero. this confirms that the total factor productivity 
(tFP) of the family firm is above the tFP of the non-family 
firm: family firms are more efficient than non-family firms 
are in transforming inputs into outputs, within their re-
spective production functions14.  
13 to obtain the estimated elasticity of output to labor, we know 
that δ = α+β–1 so the elasticity of output to labor for non-fam-
ily firms will be βNF = δNF–αNF+1 = –0.097–0.384+1=0.519;
 and for family firms will be given equal to βFA = (δNF+ δFA)–(αNF+ αFA)
+1 = (–0.097–0.167)–(0.384–0.161) + 1= 0.513.
14 We have performed some robustness tests of the results estimating 
the model with firms’ fixed effects. the coefficients of the firms’ 
dummy variables can be interpreted as the total factor productivity 
parameter of the respective firm, so we test of differences in pro-
ductive efficiency between family and non-family firms amounts 
comparing the average of estimated coefficients for family and for 
non-family firms (controlling for sector effects). if we assume the 
same production function for family and for non-family firms, we 
do not find differences between productive efficiency of the two 
forms of ownership. When we allow for differences in the produc-
tion function, we find that elasticity of output with respect to capi-
tal is lower in family than in non-family firms, while the elasticity of 
output to number of workers is the same in the two groups. moreo-
ver, in this case we find that the productive efficiency of family 
firms is higher on average than that of non-family firms. therefore, 
the empirical results are the same when we estimate with firms’ 
fixed effects than when we estimate with no fixed effects. With 
the aim of detecting whether there is endogeneity to the choice of 
family control, we have also used the methodology called effects 



































*** p ≤ 1%; ** p ≤ 5%;  * p ≤ 10%.
note: differences in observations among these regressions and the regressions of tables 6 and 8 
are due to missing data for some firms and years.
source: own elaboration. data from files of the spanish stock market Commission.
The dependent variable is Ln (Added Value/Employees). The first regression assumes the same 
production function for family and non-family firm, except for tPF. the second allows for differences 
in production function for the two groups of firms. Control variables of time and industry dummies 
in all regressions although their estimated coefficients are not reported. values of t-student 
statistics in parenthesis (computed from standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity).
profitability and financial variables 
We finally test for Hypothesis 3 of equal profitability for 
family and non-family firms. additional evidences are pro-
vided on the results of testing for differences in financial 
structure between family and non-family firms. We will 
measure the profitability of firms in terms of accounting 
of treatment with Heckman correction (1974, 1979) in two stages; 
in the first stage we estimate a probit model in which the decision 
of being a company under family control depends on the value of 
a latent variable, which is function (according to the theoretical 
model exposed) of the size, risk and main activity that the company 
caries out. From the estimations made with the probit model, we 
obtain an estimation of the reverse of mills ratio which is incorpo-
rated into the second stage, corresponding to the model that ana-
lyzes the efficiency, to correct by the effects of self-selection in the 
process of decision be or not family business. the estimation of the 
probit model results show an inverse relationship between the size 
of the firm and the family control, being the ownership structure 
independent of the risk. Concerning the statistics of the goodness 
of fit the probit model of the first stage, the Wald tests leads us 
to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables 
equal zero and therefore accepted the joint significance used vari-
ables. the estimates obtained in the first phase of the model gets a 
measure of lambda that is incorporated as an explanatory variable 
in the productive efficiency model (equation (6)). the estimation of 
the (6) model results show that this variable (lambda) is statistically 
significant and, with respect to the rest of the model variables, cor-
roborates the results presented in table 7.
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and market based measure of performance. although the 
stock market list on firms in the sample, it would be unwise 
to rely only on market-based measures of performance, 
since many of the firms are highly illiquid, their free float 
is negligible, and quoted share prices can be highly influ-
enced by prices paid in singular transactions. 
Return on assets (ROA) is the main measure of account-
ing profitability considered in the analysis. to control for 
possible differences in the cost of capital of firms, we will 
perform tests of differences in ROA between family and 
non-family firms, controlling for industry and time period 
effects, and for the average cost of debt for the firm, r, the 
proxy for the cost of capital. the return on assets divided 







ROA  and tobin’s q are the other perfor-
mance variables used in the analysis. taking into account 
that tobin’s q is equal to market to book values of the as-








is an approximation to tobin’s q for a firm with no growth 
opportunities (Market value = EBIT/r).
We also test for differences in the cost of debt r (risk) be-
tween family and non-family firms, for differences in le-
verage, Debt/Assets, and for differences in debt maturity, 
long term debt over total debt, LTDeb/Debt (now control-
ling for differences in fixes assets over total assets too).  
table 8 exhibit the main results of the empirical tests 8. 
tobin’s q is expressed in logs to account for possible het-
eroskedasticity in the residuals. in all cases, the estimat-
ed coefficient of the dummy variable of family ownership, 
FA, is not statistically significant, so the null hypothesis of 
equal profitability between the two groups of firms cannot 
be rejected15. the coefficient of the variable cost of debt 
15 tobin’s q is positively correlated with the size of the firm. if size is 
excluded from the regression, the estimated coefficient of FA is 
negative and non-significant. We do not include ROA, risk, lever-
age and other related variable in the model, as other papers do, be-
cause the q ratio already incorporates the value of these variables 
through the market value of the firm. in any case, the q ratio is posi-
tively correlated with ROA and ROA/r. We have also made profit-
ability analysis using the methodology of treatment with Heckman 
correction effects in two stages to correct by the variable “family 
control” endogeneity. in the first stage, we estimate a probit model 
in which the decision in a company under family control depending 
on the value of a latent variable which (according to the theoreti-
cal model exposed) is function of the size, risk and main activity 
that the company carries out. From the estimations made with the 
probit model, we obtain an estimation of the reverse of mills ratio 
which is incorporated into the second stage, corresponding to the 
model that analyzes profitability, to correct by the effects of self-
selection in the process of decision be or not family business. the 
estimation of the probit model results, already discusses the note 
footnote 14, show that there is an inverse relationship between size 
of the company and the family control, being the ownership struc-
ture independent of the company risk. the estimations obtained in 
is positive and significant in column 1; this is the expected 
result if firms with higher cost of capital have a higher cut-
off point in marginal return of investment projects (and 
higher average return).   





































Cost of Debt 0.09
***
(2.5)











Observations 400 394 360 443 416 378
R2 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.41
F 2.1 3.8 7.3 2.7 2.1 15.0
*** p ≤ 1%; ** p ≤ 5%;  * p ≤ 10%. differences in observations among regressions are due to 
missing data for some firms and years.
source: own elaboration. data from files of the spanish stock market Commission.  
test of differences in profitability between family and non-family firms and test for differences in fi-
nancial policy variables. Control variables of time and industry dummies in all regressions although 
their estimated coefficients are not reported. values of t-student in parenthesis. 
                                                        
the results of table 8 also confirm that the null hypothesis 
of similar financial policies of family and non-family firms 
is not rejected. some of the significant differences in the 
means of financial variables that appear in the descriptive 
analysis (table 4) disappear when we control for industry 
and time effects and for differences in the proportion of 
fixed over total assets. For example, the evidence indicates 
that family firms have proportionally more short-term debt 
than non-family firms do because they also have propor-
tionally less fixed assets in their balance sheets.
discussion and conclusion 
Research on family ownership of firms and performance 
has attracted a lot of attention in recent years with mixed 
results. most of this research compares performance, mea-
sured in terms of profitability (Roa, tobin’s q). We argue in 
this paper (drawing from institutional theories of the firm) 
the first phase of the model gets a measure of lambda which is in-
corporated as an explanatory variable more to profitability analysis 
model. Results from the estimations show that this variable (lamb-
da) is not statistically significant for any measures of profitability; 
so it is not necessary to incorporate models to avoid the problem of 
selection bias, and secondly, and to the rest of the model variables, 
corroborate the results presented in table 8.
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that the influence of ownership in performance should be 
tested with measures of productive efficiency since own-
ership affects the contracting costs (including agency 
costs) between owners and managers that, in turn, will 
affect the production possibility set of the firm. Profits 
may not be perfectly correlated with productive efficien-
cy because less productive firms can have more market 
power and because firms that are more efficient may be 
constrained by preferences for control as, we argue in the 
paper, it is the case with family firms. the paper formalis-
es these arguments and present supportive evidence with 
spanish data.
the database for the analysis is constructed from balance 
sheets and income statements of non regulated firms 
listed in the spanish stock market, as well as with infor-
mation on shareholdings of these listed firms, during the 
period 1990-2002/2004. We observe that, even control-
ling for industry effects, family firms in the sample are of 
smaller in size than non-family ones are, independently 
of the size variable used in the comparison (sales, assets, 
employees, value added); the average growth rate over 
time of total assets in family firms is lower than the aver-
age growth rate of non-family firms. We also observe that 
family firms produce with lower stock of assets per em-
ployee and their productive technology differs from that 
of the non-family firms in two ways: family firms have 
higher total factor productivity parameter and lower elas-
ticity of output to capital than non-family ones have. 
Finally, we observe that–in family firms–a marginal in-
crease in the stock of invested assets produces a higher 
(positive) marginal increase in the rate of return on invest-
ed assets than in non-family firms (where the marginal 
increase is negative). However, we find no differences in 
average profitability and no differences in financial poli-
cies between family and non-family firms.
these evidences are consistent with the hypothesis for-
mulated in the theory part of the paper based on the 
institutional analysis of firms and markets: competition 
among ownership forms drive to similar profitability for 
firms adopting each of them (firms that have character-
istics that make the chosen form the more efficient one). 
in our case, family firms face a investment size constraint 
derived from their strong preferences for control and over-
come this limitation with more productive technology. 
the analysis also confirms the relevance of making a dis-
tinction between productive efficiency and profitability 
measures of performance in testing predictions about the 
effect of ownership in the performance of firms. However, 
our result differ from those obtained in samples of listed 
Us firms during a similar period, which find that family 
firms are of equal size, produce with the same technol-
ogy (martikainen, nikkinen & vähämaa, 2009) and are 
more profitable than non-family firms (anderson & Reeb, 
2003a, villalonga & amit, 2006). We think that the ob-
served differences between the Us and spain have to do 
with institutional factors that we briefly outline below. 
in the Us, family firms do not face the same growth con-
straint as family firms in spain, since they are able to sepa-
rate family control from family ownership and can dilute 
family shareholdings without losing control. this is possible 
because the anglo-saxon legal system of governance bet-
ter protect minority shareholders rights than in the French 
legal system model. in this last system, minority sharehold-
ers are only willing to buy shares of the listed firm if the 
control group–the family, in our case–holds a large pro-
portion of shares, that is, it holds large cash flow rights 
that prevent tunnelling and other minority expropriation 
strategies. of course, this has a cost since the growth and 
risk-taking behaviour of firms (innovation) are constrained, 
compared with what would be in firms where family con-
trol does not require family majority shareholdings. 
small and medium-sized spanish firms, and firms from 
other countries with similar institutional development, 
can benefit from legal and regulatory advances that pro-
tect the rights of minority shareholders so that talented, 
innovative entrepreneurs can find cheap equity capital to 
finance growth by listing the firm on the stock exchange. 
some initiatives such as the new Governance Code and 
the new takeovers law are steps in this direction. 
the results of this paper should be extended to larger 
samples of firms and should include firms from differ-
ent countries and different institutional regimes that 
affect the way family firms address the conflicts aris-
ing from preferences for profitability and control. larg-
er samples would also permit a comparison of structural 
conditions and behavioural decisions of firms with dif-
ferent controlling shareholders (not only family versus 
non-family firms). Finally, to find measures of entrepre-
neurial capital that could be used as explanatory vari-
ables of differences in performance would be relevant. 
this is important to separate the effect of family own-
ership per se from the idiosyncratic talent of the found-
er of the firm, when explaining the comparative 
performance of family firms. existing evidence from the 
Us (villalonga & amit, 2006); Pérez-González, 2006) 
points that entrepreneurial talent is more important than 
family shareholdings or board membership in explaining 
the superior performance of family firms in that country.
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